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Abstract 
Using data covering 3 election moments (1988-2000) for 294 Flemish municipalities 
we examine whether the decision to cut tariffs before elections depends on the 
government’s expectations of staying into office. Election moments are central to 
both the political budget cycle literature and the strategic debt models. The 
combination of both theories could suggest that, at least in theory, both winning and 
loosing governments seem to benefit from pre-electoral tariff reductions and as such 
we expect to find a great many municipalities to engage into tariff cuts. The dataset 
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however shows this is clearly not the case. We argue that the differences in the fiscal 
policy reaction of governments facing elections might have to do with their 
expectations of staying into office. In our analysis we make the decision to change 
tariffs dependent on the expected vote percentage of the government party (parties). 
As we do not possess reliable ex ante data on the perceived re-election probability, 
we estimate a vote-function to predict the percentage of votes. Our analysis shows 
that tariff reductions in election years are more prone when governments expect not 
to reach majority again in next elections.  
 
Key-words : tax policy, political budget cycles, strategic debt, vote-function, local 
government 
 
JEL : H30, H71 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper deals with the question whether the expectation of getting voted 
out of office is linked to the incumbent government’s tax policy in the election year. 
The paper joins ideas from 3 different literatures: the budget cycles literature, the 
strategic debt models and the studies concerning the choice of tax tariffs.  
The study of the politicians’ behaviour at election moments is the central 
focus of the electoral cycle models (Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978), Hibbs (1977) 
and Rogoff (1990)). An impressive amount of studies have been testing various 
predictions coming from political business or fiscal cycles models. The findings are 
of particular importance for the analysis done in this paper, as we are investigating 
the effect of elections on the local tax policy of Flemish municipalities. We focus on 
fiscal policy, rather than on economic policy as the evidence concerning budget 
cycles seems much more robust (Franzese, 2002).  
Next to the electoral cycle literature, we rely on insights from the strategic 
debt models (Persson & Svensson (1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990)). In these 
models incumbents are consciously engaging in deficit spending or debt 
accumulation, the aim being to jeopardize the fiscal stance of the next government. 
The models suggest that incumbents are triggered to do so when today’s government 
fears to be voted out of office at the next elections. According to the strategic debt 
models, the perceived probability of defeat thus might be a key parameter in 
explaining policy choices preceding election moments. In our contribution we 
examine whether the probability of being a member of the next majority somehow 
determines the tariff changes of local taxes in election years. Unfortunately we do 
 3 
not possess data on the perceived chances of re-election resulting from surveys or 
face-to-face interviews. Instead of working with post election results concerning the 
effective vote distribution (see Petterson-Lidbom, 2001), we use the outcomes of an 
estimated vote function. As such, the expected votes are depending on the actual 
popularity of the government, on its fiscal policy and on the economic conditions. 
Additionally we adopt variables reflecting the institutional framework of local 
elections. As more recent contributions (Goodhart (2002), Ashworth & Heyndels 
(2002), Nelson (2000), Huber et al. (2003) and recently Geys (2007)) are suggesting, 
we expect government fragmentation to affect the opportunity to electioneer. 
Finally, only a limited number of electoral cycles studies focus on tax policy. 
Most of the time expenditures, deficits or debt are the fiscal instruments under study 
(see Rogoff (1990), Alesina et. al (1992), de Haan & Sturm (1997), Schuknecht 
(2000), Brender & Drazen (2005), Alt & Lassen (2006), Mink & de Haan (2006)). 
Yet, scholars generally agree that incumbents prefer to manipulate the instruments 
the most visible to their electorate. As tariff changes are highly visible (cfr. 
Mickesell (1978)), the dependent variable in this study is representing the relative 
tariff changes of the local income tax in the election year. This surcharge tax is 
levied by almost every local community. It collects almost 40% of total local 
government fiscal income (Dexia, 2006) and tariff cuts are affecting the majority of 
taxpayers.  
To test whether vote expectations explain fiscal policy choices, we use panel 
data covering 3 election moments (1988, 1994, 2000) for 294 Flemish local 
governments. Vote expectations are generated first, starting from the vote function 
estimated by Vermeir & Heyndels (2006), which we slightly adapted for the 
purpose. Next, fixed and random effects models were tested. Next to the key 
variable, we introduce variables representing scale, budgetary position and 
government fragmentation. The results indicate that the expectation of being a 
member of the next majority is indeed related to the magnitude of the local income 
tax tariff cuts.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a 
literature review. Section 3 formulates our research question and hypothesis. Section 
4 presents the dataset, the model and the results of the empirical analysis. Finally 
some concluding comments are given in section 5. 
  
2. Literature 
The propositions made in this paper are related to some well-established 
models in the fiscal policy literature. In this section we briefly discuss the 
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contributions of political business and budget cycle models and strategic debt 
models to the understanding of politicians’.  
 
Political business/budget cycles 
Political business cycle models expect incumbents when facing elections to 
engage in specific policies. Originally the models focussed on politicians stimulating 
the economy by manipulating macro-economic policy (political business cycles). By 
taking employment or wealth inducing measures, the government’ s popularity, and 
as a consequence its chance of staying in office was expected to increase. Still, 
Drazen (2000) concludes that models based on manipulating the economy via 
monetary policy are unconvincing both theoretically and empirically. However, 
studies studying fiscal policy (political budget cycles − PBC) are much more robust. 
A lot of empirical evidence is supporting the idea that lowering taxes, increasing 
expenditures or raising grants before elections could raise the government’ s chance 
of re-election. A general overview of the theory of PBC can be found in e.g. 
Franzese (2002) or Drazen (2000). 
After Nordhaus (1975) several generations of political economists were 
attracted by the idea of political cycles. Their contributions are the result of 
changing assumptions about the incumbents’  motivation or about the voter’ s 
attitude. Incumbents are expected to be opportunistic or partisan. Whereas 
opportunistic politicians are primarily driven by the desire to retain office and care 
little about policies or outcomes, the politicians featuring in partisan models exhibit 
strong ideological differences. Concerning the voters, later models assume them to 
act in an adaptive way or to be rationally voting citizens. Adaptive voters are 
retrospective voters. Their expectations about the future policy are determined by 
past policy. Rational voters on the contrary, are rather concerned about the impact of 
their vote after the election. Based on the combination of these different types of 
incumbents and voters Alesina (1988) discerns four generations of models.  
The first generation of models refers to Nordhaus (1975) or Tufte (1978). 
These models assume backward looking voters and opportunistic, office-seeking 
incumbents. These politicians adopt expansionary policies –regardless of political 
ideology– in the later year(s) of their term in office to stimulate the economy. While 
Nordhaus (1975) focuses on macroeconomic policies incumbents pursue to 
maximize their votes, Tufte (1978) stresses electoral cycles in directly manipulatory 
policies, such as transfer payments, to buy votes from myopic voters. Voters, being 
the victims of fiscal illusion, do not take the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government into account. By consequence they are overestimating the benefits of 
recent policy and underestimating the resulting future fiscal burden.  
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Contrary to Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) Hibbs (1977, 1987) believes 
incumbents to be driven by partisan or ideological objectives. As in the first 
generation models, voters are expected to judge retrospectively. In Hibbs’  models 
(1977, 1987) incumbents contest and voters adjudicate elections in partisan terms. 
Elections are thus ideological driven. Incumbents will try to earn a reputation that 
attracts voters in accordance with their ideology. Incumbents of the right favour low 
taxes, prefer low inflation to low unemployment and are sensitive to balanced 
budgets, the opposite being assumed for left wing voters.  
In third generation models incumbents are office-seeking, while voters are 
expected to have rational expectations. As such they are not easily to be deceived 
over long periods. We refer to the models of Cukierman & Meltzer (1986), Rogoff 
& Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). A central issue here is whether voters are able to 
observe the incumbent’ s competence level. While each candidate is assumed to 
know his own level of competency, voters are uncertain about the competency of the 
incumbents. Voters want to elect the most competent politician and form rational 
expectations about the incumbents’  competency based on observable current fiscal 
policy outcomes. With the objective of raising re-election probability incumbents 
can signal their competency by e.g. cutting taxes or rising easily observed spending 
before elections. If voters enjoy the benefits of these policies before they can 
evaluate the full cost of them, incumbents will try to signal or feign their 
competency transferring the bills to post-election moments. According to Alesina 
(1989, 63) the budgetary process is sufficiently complicated, to reasonably expect 
even relatively informed and attentive voters to be fooled at least temporarily. 
Finally Alesina (1987, 1988), Alesina & Rosenthal (1995) and Alesina et al. 
(1997) create a model in which partisan incumbents try to attract rational or 
prospective voters. Their models extend the ideas of the third generation models, but 
next to the incumbent’ s competence, elections outcome now is uncertain too. In 
these models voters could foresee what leftist or rightist governments would bring 
about, but they don’ t know the outcome of elections.  
A great many of empirical analyses have been testing the propositions 
resulting from PBC models, but evidence is mixed. Franzese (2002) points out that 
support for electoral cycles is less robust in developed countries relative to 
developing democracies. Secondly, the context (political, economic, institutional, 
structural as well as strategic) in which incumbents operate determinate the 
incentives to ‘electioneer’ . Finally, policy adjustments (i.e. budgets, expenditures, 
taxes, investments) to influence the voter’ s decision-making are relatively well-
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established while evidence for pre-electoral shifts in real outcomes (i.e. gross 
domestic product, inflation or unemployment) is at best ambiguous1. 
In this paper we look for evidence of an electoral cycle in pre-electoral tax 
policy in a local context. The setting of local governments excludes monetary policy 
as an instrument for pre-electoral opportunistic behavior. Monetary policy is the 
exclusive power of the federal government, which through its central bank is 
represented in the ECB decision-making bodies. At the local level, changes in fiscal 
policy are expected to have a more significant impact on voters’  behavior. We refer 
to Drazen (2000) who arguments that fiscal policy can clearly signal the 
government’ s competence to the electorate. More specifically we will focus on the 
most visible part of the local fiscal policy, namely tariff changes of important local 
taxes.  
 
Strategic debt models 
Strategic debt models were introduced by Persson & Svensson (1989). Their 
research question is quite clear : suppose that the current government knows that it 
will be replaced in the future by a new government with different objectives, then 
how will this affect the current government’ s behavior? In particular, will the 
current government run fiscal deficits when it knows that its successor’ s choice of 
public spending will be influenced by the level of public debt that the successor 
inherits? Do incumbent policy makers run higher budget deficits than they would 
have, if they were certain to be re-elected? In their theoretical paper Persson & 
Svensson (1989) formulate a positive answer on this last question.  
The influential paper of Persson & Svensson (1989) was followed by the 
contributions of Alesina & Tabellini (1990). Both papers emphasize strategic 
considerations concerning the government’ s debt policy, yet from another point of 
view. While Persson & Svensson (1989) focus on the level of spending, Alesina & 
Tabellini (1990) concentrate on the composition of government spending.  
Persson & Svensson (1989) argue that voters have heterogeneous preferences 
relative to the size of the government. Some of the voters want the government to 
provide some level of expenditures, while others prefer more of those expenditures 
to be provided privately. The incumbents reflect the voters’  preferences and act 
accordingly. If the more conservative (in the sense of being less expansionary) 
incumbents anticipate to be replaced after next elections, Persson & Svensson 
(1989) expect them to run a higher budget. The idea is to reduce the future public 
                                                 
1
 It is not difficult to see that it is for incumbents much easier to manipulate policy instruments than 
macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. GDP, inflation or unemployment). Governments are able control 
their own policy instruments whereas they can only hope to have some indirect impact on the 
economy (Blais & Nadeau, 1992, 390). 
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spending opportunities of the following (more liberal) government. The opposite is 
true for more liberal incumbents that are traditionally less reluctant to higher public 
expenditures. Persson & Svensson (1989) argue that more liberal incumbents will 
borrow less when convinced that they will be succeeded by a more conservative 
government.  
Alesina & Tabellini (1990) assume that governments differ with respect to 
their preferences concerning the composition of government spending. Again this is 
a reflection of the voters’  preferences. When the government knows it will be 
replaced, the leaving government will create debt in order to spend a lot of money 
on the policies in line with their voters’  preferences. This can be seen as an advance 
on the spending cut on those preferences that will coincide with the take-over of the 
next government. The marginal cost of repaying the additional debt will fall on the 
policies which matter most for the new government, but are unimportant to the 
electorate of the leaving government. Alesina & Tabellini (1990) conclude that the 
equilibrium level of public debt tends to be larger the more likely it is that the 
current government will not be re-appointed.  
Martimort (2001) extends the frameworks of Svensson & Persson (1989) and 
Alesina & Tabellini (1990) by stressing the strategic role of budget deficits when 
parties differ only with respect to their redistributive concerns. According to 
Martimort (2001) political regime switching introduces fluctuations of the 
distribution of utilities in the economy. These fluctuations justify strategic budget 
distortions by governments currently holding office and willing to favour their 
redistributive concerns against future majority. Based on his theoretical model 
Martimort (2001) expects leftist governments to create distortions by means of 
deficits, while rightist governments are expected to create surpluses. These 
theoretical expectations are contrary to those of Persson & Svensson (1989).  
Empirical research by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) is consistent with the model 
of Persson & Svensson (1989). Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) examines the 
accumulation of debt by Swedish local governments. He finds that right-wing 
governments accumulate more debt when facing higher probability of defeat, 
whereas the opposite occurs for left-wing governments.  
Other empirical studies by Lambertini (2003) and Franzese (2001) do not 
support the strategic use of deficits idea. Both examine data concerning OECD-
countries. According to Sutter (2003) the insignificance of the results of both papers 
may have been caused by problems associated with the pooling of cross-country 
data.  
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Finally, we refer to Sutter (2003), who relied on experimental design to test 
the strategic debt model propositions. Sutter (2003) states that ceteris paribus, 
deficits decrease with a higher probability of being re-elected.  
All studies cited so far are referring to budget deficits primarily driven by 
conscious increases in public expenditures. In this paper we use the strategic debt 
models from another point of view. Creating a deficit can also be the result of 
decreasing revenues, while keeping expenditures constant of letting them grow even 
further. In this contribution we specifically focus on this revenue site of the budget 
and estimate a tax tariff function. 
 
3. Discussion 
 
We belief this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we 
explain local tax policy by introducing the perceived probability of getting into 
office again. Whether an incumbent decides to manipulate tariffs or other fiscal 
instruments, is depending on the perceived need to take visible actions on the eve of 
elections. This is in line with Tufte’ s (1978) statement that electoral cycles require 
opportunity and motive. Cyclical behaviour becomes more likely when there is 
political ability to manipulate policy and when it is more needed. In the strategic 
debt models this need is formulated in a rather definitive way. The government will 
engage in deficit-spending or accumulate debt when “the government knows that it 
will be replaced” (Persson & Svensson, 1989 : 325). In this paper, we mitigate this 
assumption, stating that uncertainty about getting re-elected is already sufficient to 
act strategically. We refer to Rogoff (1990, 30) who explicitly states that “the 
prospect of being able to run for re-election again raises the temptation to distort 
fiscal policy”. Additionally, it should be noted that we do not take the viewpoint of 
individual politicians. Rather we focus on the position of the seated majority. We 
investigate whether expectations about being a member of the next majority might 
be a decisive factor in the process. 
Secondly, the paper contributes to the relatively limited empirical evidence 
concerning incumbents’  strategic behaviour at a local government level. We are only 
aware of the Pettersson-Lidbom-study (2001) which goes into the debt accumulation 
of Swedish local governments. Except for Geys (2007), Drazen & Eslava (2005), 
Binet & Pentecôte (2004), Veiga & Veiga (2004) and Brender (2003).2 The same 
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 Drazen & Eslava (2005) find a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a 
contraction of other types of expenditures in Colombian municipalities in the period 1987-2000. 
Binet & Pentecôte (2004) show that election-motivated tax manipulation in French municipalities 
can be done by tariff cuts. Veiga & Veiga (2004) find that expenditures of Portuguese 
municipalities over the 1979-2000 period increase in pre-election periods, especially on items that 
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goes for the PBC. Here too, country level data dominate. Yet a local-level context 
offers a number of advantages. Flemish municipalities share common political and 
constitutional systems, experience common economic shocks, employ similar 
budgetary processes, have identical electoral rules and voter preferences are 
reasonably homogeneous across municipalities. Unlike studies using country data, 
we are able to control for institutional aspects and economic conditions that have 
been found in the literature to play an important role in determining fiscal policy 
choices. An additional advantage is related to the number of cases in the analysis. 
Municipal data allow testing panel data models with a much larger number of 
observations. Finally, the pertinency to look at Flemish local governments from the 
angles taken by the political budget cycle or strategic debt models is supported by 
the recent study by Geys (2007). This paper clearly demonstrates that the level of 
political fragmentation affects both the need for and possibility to engage in 
opportunistic policy cycles. Though we are both examining local government 
behaviour, our approach differs from that used in the Pettersson-Lidbom-study. The 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) ‘probability of defeat’ -variable was reconstructed on the 
basis of the election outcomes. In this paper we rely on the large literature on vote 
and popularity functions. Instead of working with the actual post election results, we 
estimate a specific vote function. We assume that the expected votes are depending 
on the current popularity of the government, on its fiscal policy and on the economic 
conditions. Additionally we adopt variables reflecting the local institutional 
framework. As the contributions of Goodhart (2002), Ashworth & Heyndels (2002), 
Nelson (2000), Huber et al. (2003) and recently Geys (2007) are suggesting, we 
expect government fragmentation to affect the opportunity to electioneer. 
Finally, we would like to point to the fact that this paper is investigating tariff 
cuts. Tariff changes as such very rarely are the dependent variable in PBC research. 
We are only acquainted with the research of Mikesell (1978), Nelson (2000) and 
Binet & Pentecôte (2004)3. Tax rates defined as tax revenues as a share of GDP are 
                                                                                                                                                          
are highly visible to the electorate (e.g., highways and streets). Brender (2003) shows that fiscal 
performance of Israeli mayors substantially affected their re-election probability in the 1998 
campaign, but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns. 
3
 Mikesell (1978) shows that tariff cuts in American states have been concentrated in the latter 
years of the electoral cycle in the period 1960-1977. Tariff increases on the contrary are more 
likely to occur in the year immediately after election years than in election years. Working on a 
similar but larger dataset (1946-1993) Nelson (2000) affirmed the occurrence of tariff increases, 
while he finds little evidence that U.S. state politicians strategically time tariff cuts to occur around 
election periods. Binet & Pentecôte (2004) show that tariff cuts are used for election-motivated tax 
manipulation in French municipalities. 
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more common4. Tax revenues are another measure in the study of the political 
manipulation of tax policy5. Such data may be a less accurate reflection of elected 
officials’  intentions, as taxes paid also reflect economic conditions. We are 
convinced that in for the panel of Flemish local authorities it is more convenient to 
look for tariff reductions. The tax under research is a surcharge tax of which each 
municipality has to set its own tariff (including 0) while the tax base is based on the 
same legislation. Consequently, voters can easily compare their hometown tariff 
with those of neighbouring municipalities or municipalities with the same 
characteristics.6 This makes a pre-electoral tariff cut an ideal instrument for 
incumbents to signal their competence prior to elections.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we empirically asses whether the prospects of electoral 
outcome are decisive in pre-electoral tax policy. Section 4.1 familiarizes the 
unacquainted reader with some crucial characteristics of Flemish local governments 
and their functioning. Section 4.2 outlines our dependent variable. Section 4.3 
presents the methodology and the empirical model. Finally section 4.4 discusses the 
empirical results. 
 
4.1 Institutional context 
In this empirical part of the paper we use a panel data set covering the period 
1988 to 2000, containing 294 (of the 308) Flemish municipalities, capturing 3 
election moments. 
Flemish local governments have a parliamentary system consisting of the 
local council (the legislative body) and the College of Mayor and Alderman (the 
executive body). Seats in the council are allocated using a system of proportional 
representation (PR)7. The composition of the College is determined by the party (or 
parties) holding a majority position in the council. Our setting is likely to be 
sensitive to opportunistic political business cycles and strategic debt models. Firstly, 
elections are held every 6 years at the second Sunday of October so election 
                                                 
4
 To name only two of them Bizer & Durlauf (1990) demonstrate that average tax rates follow a 
pattern consistent with a political tax cycle and van der Ploeg (1989) shows that a government cuts 
the tax rate towards election eve in order to gain votes. 
5
 Poterba (1994) finds tax increases to be significantly smaller in election years than at other times. 
Yoo (1998) shows that Japanese tax revenues decrease with a statistically significant amount in the 
year immediately before the elections of the House of Representatives. 
6
 The theory on yardstick competition suggests that this comparison influences inhabitants in their 
votes (Besley & Case, 1995) 
7
 In a system of proportional representation (PR) each party is allocated a certain number of seats in 
proportion to the votes it obtains in the elections 
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moments are planned. Secondly, incumbents can be indefinitely re-elected (i.e. there 
are no binding term limits), giving them the opportunity to carefully prepare their re-
election strategy. Thirdly, systems of proportional representation are well 
established to be inherently more unstable than pluralist electoral systems 
(Duverger, 1954/1972). As such opportunistic and strategic policies become more 
tempting. 
Flemish municipalities enjoy a far-reaching autonomy in their fiscal policies. 
Besides taxation, grants from higher levels of government (which are for the most 
part unconditional) and dividends from municipal associations are the most 
important sources of revenue. Taxation, the focal point of the current paper, 
generates approximately half of the Flemish municipalities’  revenues. Over four 
fifths of this tax income derives from surcharge taxes on regional and federal taxes 
on immovable property (i.e. the local property tax – LPT) and labour income (i.e. 
the local income tax – LIT). Higher governments define both tax bases while the 
local Councils are free to set any tax rate (including 0).8 LPT and LIT rates are voted 
by the Council in which the parties of the College have a majority. 
 
4.2 Dependent variable 
Mostly budgetary variables as expenditures, transfers, surplus/deficit and debt 
are used to prove a political budget cycle.9 But also revenue information and more 
specific tax revenue information can be helpful explaining cycling behavior. In this 
paper the dependent variable of the (second) analysis will be tariff changes of the 
local income tax in election year. By cutting tariffs before elections, the government 
could give the voter the impression that it works efficient since expenditures can be 
paid with a reduced tax burden.  
From the PBC-perspective, we expect incumbents to lower tariffs when it is 
doubtful that it will be getting a majority of the votes at the next election. If the 
government anticipates reaching nearly 50% of the votes, reducing tariffs might just 
be an opportunistic action aimed at bringing in the necessary additional votes. If on 
                                                 
8
 However, besides the surcharge taxes mentioned above, municipalities also collect local taxes of 
which they set the tax base as well as the tax rate. In fact, the average Flemish municipality collects 
about 15 of such taxes and the most ‘exotic’  taxes can be found among the more than 120 local 
taxes that are currently in use: taxes on private swimming pools, on balconies, on transportation of 
drunken persons, on dogs, boats and so on. 
9
 Blais & Nadeau (1992) show that spending is increased in election years in Canadian provinces. 
Alesina (1988) finds a significant election year increase in net transfer over GNP for the U.S. Shi & 
Svensson (2003) consider a panel data set of 91 countries and find that in an election year the 
government surplus falls significantly. Brender & Drazen (2005) look for budget cycles using 
expenditures, transfers and the balance in a large cross-section of countries. Geys’  (2007) analysis 
of local public debt data for 296 Flemish municipalities provides empirical support for 
opportunistic policy cycles. 
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the contrary the government, whatever policy followed to gain additional votes, 
expects the election to result in a rather small share of the votes, it can decide to act 
strategically and reduce the tax burden to saddle the next government with higher 
debts. The latter being in line with the strategic debt models. 
From the PBC-point of view, both winning and loosing incumbents profit 
from lowering taxes. Still, we assume that local governments being sure of 
succeeding themselves will not engage in such policies. We argue that the marginal 
cost of this action in the post-election period is larger than the marginal benefits in 
the year preceding elections. The decision by the current government to cut a tariff 
would reduce the scope for policymaking of the next government.  
There is no doubt that tariff changes are visible and strong. Wagner (1971) 
already mentioned that tariff changes are a relatively visible form of tax legislation 
changes to voters. Tariff changes get public attention, legislative debate and voter 
attention (Mikesell, 1978), but possibly the strongest effect is that, ceteris paribus, 
all voters experience a reduced tax demand. Tariff cuts thus meet the condition Tufte 
(1978) stipulates that a measure to manipulate vote behavior ‘must yield clear and 
immediate economic benefits to a large number of voters’ . Other modifications of 
the tax laws (tax base changes, additional exemptions,…) tend to be less visible, are 
not always well understood by the general public (Nelson, 2000) and rarely reduce 
tax demand by all taxpayers. 
Our analysis explains tDULIIFKDQJHVRI/,7 /,7it) in election years. Vermeir 
& Heyndels (2006) show in their research on the electoral cost of tax policy in 
Flemish municipalities that the level of both the LIT and the LPT rate have a 
negative influence on the vote for the government parties, which shows that Flemish 
voters are sensible to tax policy changes. In this study we only use tariff cuts on LIT 
as the dependent variable of the analysis. Tax cuts of LIT are more appropriate as 
they are highly visible since all voters benefit from LIT tariff cuts, while only 
proprietors favor from LPT tariff cuts10. Ashworth & Heyndels (2000) show that 
local politicians indeed prefer changes of the LIT to realize a fall in tax revenue.11 
Compared to other local taxes, LIT does not differ between municipalities except for 
the tariff. Other local taxes vary in frequency and have individual municipal tax 
codes which make it difficult to compare municipalities. 
                                                 
10
 LPT is due by proprietors only. Renters are no property taxes indebted so they don’ t benefit from 
LPT cuts. Proprietors on the other hand can be domiciled elsewhere and thus not be entitled to vote 
and reward the government for reducing LPT. Compared to LIT reductions, LPT cuts are less 
interesting for politicians to gain votes in next elections. 
11
 Ashworth & Heyndels (2000, 126) questioned 637 local politicians (48% of population) about 
how they would realise a given fall in tax revenue. They show that 59,5% of the respondents would 
realize this by lowering the LIT, while only 8,8% would prefer reducing the LPT. 26,2% would 
reduce both taxes and only 5,5% would lower other local taxes. 
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7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHRIRXUVHFRQGHVWLPDWLRQ /,7it is the relative change 
of the local income tax rate in year t compared to year t-1. Positive values indicate 
tariff increases, while negative values refer to tariff cuts.  
 
4.3 Empirical model  
In this section we present our empirical model. Our model contains two 
regressions. First we estimate a vote function. Secondly the estimated vote 
percentage that results from the vote function is used as explanatory variable to 
explain pre-electoral tariff cuts  /,7it). The second regression will focus on our 
research question and will show whether or not pre-electoral tax behaviour depends 
on the government’ s prospects of the electoral result. Prospects of the electoral 
result have already been used by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) to explain debt policy. If 
we follow his model to explain pre-electoral tariff policy in Flemish municipalities, 
we could explain /,7it in election years as a function of the incumbent’ s 
probability of electoral defeat (Dit). More formally, 
 
LITit = 0 + 1 Dit + 2 Yit + uit ;  (1) 
 
where i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994 and 2000   
 
Dit is the pre-electoral estimation of the incumbent’ s probability of electoral 
defeat, Yit is a vector of variables affecting fiscal policy and uit is an error term. 
Index i denotes local governments and index t election years 1988, 1994 and 2000.  
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) uses ex post election outcome as a proxy variable to 
estimate the probability of electoral defeat (Dit). To correct for endogeneity and 
measurement error problems associated with the proxy he uses an instrumental 
variable approach. The set of instrumental variables is restricted to historic vote 
results and the frequency of previous government changes.  
Still we believe that other variables, like economic, other political and tax 
variables can have an impact on upcoming electoral results. We refer to what has 
been studied intensively in the literature on vote functions. In general these 
functions explain the vote (or the change in the vote) for the government at elections 
by (the change in) economic, political and tax variables (Nannestad & Paldam, 
1994). Mughan (1987, 198) even makes clear that the primary purpose of vote 
functions should be forecasting –“ predicting the outcome of an event before it 
occurs”– in stead of explaining. If these vote functions indeed give the government 
an indication of upcoming election results, they can tune their tax behaviour to them. 
Since the vote percentage the current government receives at next elections is the 
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principal condition for their continuation, we take the expected vote percentage as 
explanatory variable in our model to explain pre-electoral fiscal policy. Of course 
the continuation of the government depends on the final electoral results.  
Our model is based on the Pettersson-Lidbom model, but we replace his crucial 
variable −probability of electoral defeat (Dit)− by the predicted values resulting from 
a variant of Vermeir & Heyndels’  (2006) vote function for Flemish municipalities12. 
This vote function takes besides ex post election outcome also economic and fiscal 
variables into account. In this paper we estimate a new vote function that comparing 
to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) leaves out tax variables to avoid econometric 
problems in the second regression of our model.13 Equation (2) estimates the vote 
percentage of the government party (or parties) in Flemish municipalities: 
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6− =  α0 + α1 
[ ]tt
itV
,6
6
−
−
+ α2 EXPit + α3 NEXPit + α4 INCit + α5 UNEMPLit + α6 
NPARit + year dummies + uit  (2) 
 
where:  i = 1,..., N; t = election years  
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6− represents the vote percentage obtained at election year t in municipality i 
by the party (or parties14) that was (were) in government over the previous 
legislature. The vote percentage of the same party (parties) six years before in the 
previous elections ( [ ]ttitV ,66−− ) is introduced to control for the influence for past events 
and is expected to have a positive impact on the number of votes.15 Per capita 
expenditures (EXPit) are included to measure for the quantity (and/or quality) of 
public output. A positive impact on the votes is expected. We refer to the theory of 
yardstick voting to include also the average per capita expenditures of the 
                                                 
12
 Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) developed a vote function model for Flemish municipalities and 
show empirical evidence for yardstick voting. 
13
 The introduction of the tarriffs in the vote function would cause econometric problems as the 
second regression estimates tarrif changes and introduces the predicted value of the vote function, 
which would capture the impact of the tariffs, as explanatory variable.  
14
 The vote share corresponds with the sum of the share of the coalition partners in the case of 
coalition governments. 
15
 Remark that this lagged term implies that our estimation is effectively limited to the 1983-2000 
period. Another implication is that the dataset does not contain data of all Flemish municipalities. 
Sometimes it is impossible to calculate previous election results of the government. Parties may 
split up, merge with another party or change their names. Also parties can disappear and not 
compete in next elections or a member of the government can change parties. The dataset that 
corresponds with that of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) only contains observations of which previous 
election results can be undisputebly calculated. We thus are confronted with an unbalanced panel 
as we do not have observations for every election in every municipality. Finally our dataset 
contains 688 observations of 294 (out of 308) municipalities. 
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neighbouring municipalities (NEXPit).16 Here a negative sign is expected. As 
literature on economic voting suggests that governments are held accountable for 
economic developments17, income per capita (INCit) and unemployment rate 
(UNEMPLit) are introduced. Income is expected to have a positive effect on votes, 
while the opposite is true for unemployment. Political characteristics enter vote 
function (2) through the number of government parties (NPARit) measuring for 
clearity of responsability. More coalition partners are expected to reduce the 
transparency. Fragmented governments are thus held less accountable for positive 
and negative developments (Powell & Whitten, 1993). As governments are more 
punished for negative developments than they are rewarded for positive 
developments, Nicholson & Segura (2002) show that fragmented governments 
generally suffer smaller electoral losses. A positive effect of the number of 
government parties on the vote is thus expected. The possibility of vote swings 
between the governments is another possible explanation for a positive coefficient. 
Year dummies are introduced to capture possible year effects.18 Descriptive statistics 
of all explanatory variables are shown in Table A1 in appendix. 
Next we use vote function (2) to predict the vote percentage at upcoming 
elections. Correlation analysis shows that predicted values ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,6− )19 are highly 
correlated with the actual ex-post election results (rp=0,85). Mean value over all 
election periods is 54,93 which indicates that a government on average awaits to get 
54,93% of the votes and thus expects to be continued in the next legislature.20 Then 
we transform [ ]tt
itp
V ,6−  by reducing their values with 50 to get positive and negative 
values. [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
21
 is called the expected vote balance as positive values express the 
surplus of expected vote percentage above majority, while negative values express 
the expected shortage of vote percentage to continue the current government.
 
 
                                                 
16
 The theory on yardstick competition suggests that voters compare the own municipality to their 
neighbouring municipalities when deciding on their vote (Besley & Case, 1995). 
17
 Remark that these economic variables are the result of macro-economic policy which is mainly a 
federal and regional responsibility. Despite their objective to interfere local governments may still 
have a (marginal) influence or may be held accountable by the electorate. Local governments can 
e.g. approve the layout of additional company grounds or decide to lower local company taxes to 
stimulate local economic activity. 
18
 We refer to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) for more information on the vote function and its 
explanatory variables. 
19
 We add suffix p to indicate that values are predicted. 
20
 We refer to table A2 in appendix for more descriptive statistics on the predicted and actual votes. 
21
 We add suffix -50 to indicate that values are rescaled. 
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When replacing Dit by [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
 
equation (1) can be written
 
as : 
 
LITit = β0 + β1 [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
+ β2 Yit + uit ;  (3) 
 
/,7it is the relative change of the local income tax rate in election year t 
compared to the year before. Negative values represent tariff cuts, while the opposite 
is true for positive values. Following PBC and SD models, we do not expect positive 
values. Table A3 (in appendix) SUHVHQWV GHVFULSWLYH VWDWLVWLFV RI /,7it and shows 
indeed that all values are negative. On average tariffs are cut by 1,02% in election 
years. Variable Yit in equation (3) stands for variables affecting fiscal policy. 
Although we expect strategic or opportunistic motivations for pre-electoral tariff 
reductions, other motivations could explain tariff reductions. For these íPDinly 
financialí YDULables we add control variables. E.g. the use of an earlier amassed 
financial surplus could be an explanation for tax reductions. BALANCEit-1 controls 
for the existence of a surplus (positive) or a deficit (negative) in the year before 
elections. A municipality with a surplus in the previous year could opt to transfer 
this to its taxpayers by cutting its tariff.22 A negative sign is thus expected. We also 
control for the impact of the revenue level. REVit is the level of revenues per capita 
in the year of elections. As the relative impact of tariff changes on the total revenue 
level is smaller the higher the level of revenues, we expect a negative sign. We add a 
variable to control for changes in the taxable income that could explain tariff cuts. 
TIit-1 measures the change of the taxable income during the previous year in 
percentage of the taxable income of the year before that. If the taxable income 
increases, a tariff cut could be expected, so a negative sign is awaited. Besides 
financial reasons we can also think of political motivations to reduce the LIT tariff 
before elections. Since the theory of the PBC shows that manipulation of policy may 
be easier for strong, one-party governments and become more difficult the larger the 
number of parties, we add the number of parties of the current government (NPARit) 
as explanatory variable. More fragmented governments are expected to be less 
susceptible to pre-electoral tax reductions, thus we expect a negative coefficient 
(Geys, 2007). Population size (POPit) is introduced to control for the size of the 
municipality. Small municipalities are expected to cut more easily taxes as large 
municipalities are confronted with higher expenses (Ashworth et al., 2005) and thus 
have less financial margin to cut taxes. We thus expect a positive sign. Finally 
inclusion of the year-specific dummies (D1994 and D2000) allows us to control for 
                                                 
22
 Contrary a deficit in a previous year could be financed by raising taxes in the year thereafter. 
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year-specific effects. When we replace Yit in equation (3) with these control 
variables23, equation (3) can be written as :  
 
LITit = β0 + β1 [ ]ttitpV ,650 −−  + β2 BALANCEit-1 + β3 REVit + β4 TIit-1 + β5 NPARit 
+ β6 POPit + β7 D1994 + β8 D2000 + uit   (4) 
 
4.4 Results 
 Table 1 and Table 2 present the results of estimations (2) and (4). We show 
regressions including all variables tested as well as more efficient regressions in 
which insignificant variables are left out. Both models contain a linear regression on 
panel data with fixed effects and covers data from 688 observations24. For both 
models we also considered pooled linear regression and panel data analysis with 
random effects. Formal tests confirm the use of a panel data model with fixed 
effects. Restricted F-tests rejected the use of pooled linear regressions25, while 
Hausman-tests (p < 0,01) reject twice the 0-hypothesis that fixed effects and random 
effects estimators do not differ substantially. By consequence models with fixed 
effects are preferable (Gujarati, 2003, 268, 651).  
 
                                                 
23
 Descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables are shown in table A3 in appendix. 
24
 For remarks on the composition of the dataset we refer to footnote 17. A t-test shows that 
average LITit does not differ significantly between the sample and the omitted observations (t = 
1.091 and p = 0.275). 
25
 F≅2.12 for the vote function model and F≅4.11 for the estimation of LITit . 
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Table 1 : Panel regression estimation results of the vote-function 
Dependent variable : [ ]ttitV
,6−
 
All variables Significant variables 
[ ]tt
itV
,6
6
−
−
 
0.541202*** (10.00937) 0.537021*** (10.04166) 
EXPit -3.709042 (-0.678441) - 
NEXPit 6.802067 (0.910847) - 
INCit -0.603609 (-0.343501) -1.692760*** (-3.955160) 
UNEMPLit 30.71368 (0.473219) - 
NPARit 7.141676*** (7.445654) 7.215794*** (7.723841) 
D1994 -1.254246 (-0.668628) - 
D2000 -2.043619 (-0.574095) - 
Intercept 14.22952 (1.452019) 22.27041*** (6.403603) 
R² 0.726792 0.725607 
Adjusted R² 0.513746 0.517882 
F-statistic26 (p-value) 3.411435 (<0.01) 3.493116 (<0,01) 
Hausman (p-value) 64.777084 (<0.01) 63.321776 (<0.01) 
N 688 
Number of cross sections 294 
Time series length 3 
Note : Values in parentheses are t-values (except for F-statistic and Hausman test, where p-values are presented); 
* significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the vote-function estimation. The last column of table 
1 presents the most efficient estimation and shows that the lagged vote percentage 
( [ ]ttitV ,66−− ), the income variable (INCit) and the number of parties (NPARit) have a 
significant impact on the vote percentage of government parties. All three variables 
are significant at the 1% level. The sign of INCit is opposite to the expectations. 
Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) explain this negative sign by refering to the “ clientele 
hypothesis”  that could explain that at lower levels of per capita income, voters tend 
to stay with of go back to traditional government parties (Rattinger, 1981, 1991). 
The lack of impact of the expenditure variables could be due to the fact that the level 
of expenditures is not a good measure of the quality of the public output. Voters do 
not hold local governments responsible for macro-economic policy, which is indeed 
a federal responsibility. We find no significant impact of the unemployment rate on 
the vote percentage of local Flemish governments. 
 
                                                 
26
 F-statistic tests the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients in a regression are zero. If the p-
value –the marginal significance level of the F-test- is below the significance level that is testing –
which is the case–, the 0-hypothesis that alle slope coefficients are zero is rejected. 
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Table 2 : Panel regression estimation results of the tariff cut function 
Dependent variable : LITit All variables Significant variables 
[ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
 0.001461 (2.492630)** 0.001374 (2.334225)** 
BALANCEit-1 -4.88E-6 (-3.278626)*** -5.61E-6 (-4.076637)*** 
REVit 6.05E-7 (0.833663) - 
TIit-1 0.179404 (2.228890)** - 
NPARit -0.029115 (-3.607662)*** -0.029217 (-3.602896)*** 
POPit 3.80E-6 (1.007728) 6.84E-6 (1.987590)** 
D1994 0.001908 (0.251013) - 
D2000 0.011137 (03932349) 0.009304 (2.162363)** 
Intercept -0.139658 (-1.863225)* -0.162288 (-2.325653)** 
R² 0.649807 0.643028 
Adjusted R² 0.375306 0.368150 
F-statistic (p-value) 2.367233 (<0.01) 2.339321 (<0.01) 
Hausman (p-value)   
N 688 
Number of cross Sections 294 
Time series length 3 
Note : Values in parentheses are t-values (except for F-statistic and Hausman test, where p-values are presented); 
* significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
  
7DEOH  SUHVHQWV WKH UHVXOWV RI WKH HVWLPDWLRQ RI LITit. The most efficient 
estimation makes clear that the expected vote balance ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
), the financial 
balance (BALANCEit-1), the number of coalition parties (NPARit) and the number of 
inhabitants (POPit) are significant at least at the 5% level and all have the expected 
sign. Dummy variable D2000 indicates that year specific effects play a role in 2000.  
The expected vote balance variable [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
 is significant at the 5% level 
(0,0201) and positive which leads us to conclude that tax behavior in election years 
indeed depends on the government’ s prospects of the electoral results. The sign is 
positive which suggests that governments prospecting no majority ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
<0) 
decide to cut their tariff  LITit<0). This is in line with the theoretical expectations. 
The higher the expected shortage of votes to reach majority, the higher the tax cuts 
and, if re-election indeed does not follow, the higher the impact on next 
government’ s policy-making. This could be explained from strategic motivations 
(SD models). The positive coefficient also indicates that governments expecting a 
majority ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
>0) do not cut taxes  LITit≥0)27 before elections. This is 
reasonable as this would reduce current and/or future spending or would need a 
future tariff increase, which is unlikely as this reduces the government’ s popularity.  
                                                 
27
 Our dataset shows that no Flemish municipality increased its tariff in election years. 
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BALANCEit-1 also shows the expected (negative) sign. Governments with a 
surplus the year before elections seem to offset tax rates with this positive balance. 
As expected NPARit has a negative sign suggesting that tariff cuts are more difficult 
to decide the more government parties have to agree. Finally POPit presents a 
positive sign and confirms that smaller municipalities more easily cut tariffs. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
 
There is a lot of empirical evidence that supports the theory of the political 
budget cycle. Contrary to the bulk of the literature that examines expenditures, 
deficits or debt, this paper looks for the existence of a political tariffs cycle. Tariff 
cuts can be expected before elections, not only from a PBC point of view, but also 
relying on the theory of the strategic use of debt.  
Except for a limited number of papers there is very little known about the 
determinants of tariff cuts. We can only refer to Mikesell (1978), Nelson (2000) and 
Binet & Pentecôte (2004). Our analysis contributes to this research by stressing the 
role of the government’ s prospects of getting into office again. We introduce the 
expected vote percentage at the next elections as an explanatory variable for tariff 
changes in election years. Our model makes use of predictions derived from a vote 
function as a proxy for electoral outcome expectations. The empirical analysis 
shows that in election years prospects of the electoral results are decisive for local 
tax rate changes. Our results suggest that governments expecting to loose a majority 
position are more prone to cutting the tariffs of the local income tax.  
The empirical analysis shows that the expectation of being a member of the 
next majority is indeed related to the magnitude of the local income tax tariff cuts in 
election years. Still we are conscious of the fact that our results are exploratory. We 
are aware of the fact that the expected vote balance is only a proxy to measure for 
the government’ s prospects. It might be more convenient to collect survey data 
about the perceived survival probability in future election years. Further options for 
future research are to verify the robustness of our model by testing the model using a 
dataset characterized by a larger time horizon and other tax instruments. Another 
challenge could be the enlargement of the model with non-election years to look for 
real cyclic behavior. Our results (of election years only) only suggest the existence 
of cyclic behavior. An extension with non-election years would also permit to 
control for partisan influences as fiscal post election reactions would become 
perceptible in the model.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6−
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6
6
−
−
 
EXPit NEXPit INCit UNEMPLit NPARit 
mean 54.9334 56.2400 0.6679 0.6907 5.4918 0.0272 1.6294 
median 54.0441 55.0833 0.6189 0.6672 5.4514 0.0237 2.0000 
maximum 87.3000 88.2900 2.1809 1.8196 8.8819 0.0764 5.0000 
minimum 24.1543 37.2478 0.2327 0.4176 3.2060 0.0063 1.000 
std. dev. 10.1811 8.3241 0.2453 0.1684 0.9614 0.0132 0.6809 
observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
 
  
per capita in 
1000 euro 
per capita in 
1000 euro 
per capita in 
1000 euro   
 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Predicted vote Actual vote 
 correlation 0.8518 
 mean  54.9334  54.9334 
 median  54.5724  54.0441 
 maximum  81.2700  87.3000 
 minimum  24.6000  24.1543 
 std. dev.  8.6725  10.1811 
 observations  688  688 
 
Table A3 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
All econometric and statistical analyses are performed with Eviews 5.1. 
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mean -0.0102 4.9334 1094.1132 25338.6582 0.0646 1.6294 18570.6613 
median 0.0000 4.5724 1026.6261 24194.7814 0.0606 2.0000 12754 
maximum 0.0000 31.2700 7063.4083 77105.1910 0.1585 5.0000 476044 
minimum -0.8333 -25.4000 -6981.8358 9035.8263 -0.0643 1.0000 964 
std. dev. 0.0524 8.6725 1625.5049 9375.4852 0.0303 0.6809 26441.6719 
observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
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